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Abstract 
One of the enduring lines of division and potential conflict within any representative 
democracy is between the represented and the representatives. Just what do our 
elected representatives represent? One answer is representation of the views and 
interests of voters which, collectively, amount to ‘the public interest’. In a 
representative democracy most citizens are not in a position to represent their own 
views and interests directly most of the time. Hence we have the democratic 
institution of elections through which members of parliament are chosen to represent 
the interests of their constituents. One problem with such collective notions of 
representation is that different individuals have different interests and thus 
representing the public interest is no uncomplicated matter. However, the 
representation of the public interest is arguably as much about process as it is about 
substance. One of the key aims of this paper is to consider, from the voter’s 
perspective, how well political institutions, parties and elected representatives appear 
to behave in ways that are consistent with representing the public interest. A second 
aim is to see whether perspectives on the public interest diverge substantially 
according to social and political differences within the public. 
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Introduction 
One of the enduring lines of division and potential conflict within any representative 
democracy is between the represented and the representatives, between the electors 
and the elected. As the late New Zealand political scientist Keith Jackson (1987: 69) 
remarked, ‘One of the great roles of parliament … is that of representation’. He goes 
on to add: ‘But representation of what?’ One answer is representation of the views 
and interests of voters which, collectively, amount to ‘the public interest’. In a 
representative democracy most citizens are not in a position to represent their own 
views and interests directly most of the time. Hence we have the democratic 
institution of elections through which members of parliament are chosen to represent 
the interests of their constituents.  
 Of course, one problem with such collective notions of representation is that 
different individuals have different interests and thus representing the public interest 
is no uncomplicated matter. First the public interest has to be identified. On any 
particular issue the chances of there being a consensus as to what the public interest is 
are slim. However, the representation of the public interest is arguably as much about 
process as it is about substance. One of the key aims of this paper is not so much to 
identify what the public interest might be but to consider, from the perspective of the 
voters who are represented by members of parliament in a democracy, how well 
political institutions, parties and elected representatives appear to behave in ways that 
are consistent with representing the public interest. A second aim is to see whether 
perspectives on the public interest diverge substantially according to social and 
political differences within the public. 
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The Public Interest  
Ways of characterising the public interest are many and varied. The notion of the 
public interest can be seen as rhetorical, procedural and aggregative, as constituting 
fundamental values or shared interests (McLeay, 2006). The political philosopher, 
Brian Barry, argued that at its most fundamental level, the public interest refers to 
interests which people have in common as members of the public (Barry, 1965). Even 
then, according to some writers, the public interest can be defined from two different 
perspectives, ‘the utilitarian view’ and ‘the rights-oriented view’. The utilitarian view 
sees the public interest as amounting to ‘the sum of individual preferences’ while the 
rights oriented view ‘would constrain utilitarian considerations by insisting on certain 
individual rights and entitlements’ (Sandel, 1988: 109). The emphasis on the ‘certain 
individual rights and entitlements’ in the second approach suggests a concern for 
minorities and perspectives that may not meet with universal popularity, in contrast to 
the majoritarian connotations in the ‘sum of individual preferences’ approach.  
 The ‘sum of individual preferences’ approach is also consistent with a 
definition of the public interest as the ‘common good’ (Goodin, 1996: 332-33). The 
public interest in this sense is seen in contrast to factional or sectional interests. 
Goodin argues that this amounts to what he calls a ‘least-common-denominator’ 
notion of the public interest, where the public interest is only about the interests 
everyone happens to have in common. Something is only in the public interest when it 
is in every private individual’s interest. In contrast, Goodin argues for a ‘highest 
common concern’ notion of the public interest, whereby the public interest is about 
interests people necessarily share as members of the public and which require public 
action to promote them (Goodin, 1996: 339). In other words, this definition focuses 
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on the interests that we all need to pursue together as public goods rather than what is 
left over once we take out all our private interests. 
 In the New Zealand context, Richard Mulgan (1984) has pointed to the crucial 
role of government in defending and promoting the public interest. Where various 
private and sectional interests compete to shape policy there is a danger that the broad 
interests of the general public will not be adequately considered. In these 
circumstances ‘Responsibility for pressing the claims of the public interest when it 
clashes with sectional interests lies with the government’ (Mulgan, 1984: 144). This 
responsibility means that, despite the public interest being ‘dilute and without 
powerful, independent spokes[people]’ the electorate is able to exercise some control 
over public policy through the ballot box, given that ‘politicians’ desire for popularity 
with the electorate gives them an incentive to consider the wider interests of 
consumers and the public as a whole’ (Mulgan, 1984: 144).  
These reflections on the importance of the relationship between politicians and 
voters in consideration of the public interest bring us back to the key focus of this 
paper, the connection between the representatives and the represented and in 
particular how the latter perceive the performance of the former in defending the 
public interest. Mulgan’s discussion also makes it clear that the crucial emphasis in 
this link is on issues of process and mechanisms for promoting the public interest. 
Thus we would expect the public to be concerned about whether and how political 
institutions and politicians act in the public interest irrespective of what that public 
interest might be in any one situation. 
As two nations with a long history of similarity in their political systems and 
voter responses (Bean, 1988; Vowles and McAllister, 1996), Australia and New 
Zealand provide fertile ground for a comparative analysis of attitudes to questions 
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about the public interest. Notwithstanding the recent structural divergence in the form 
of New Zealand’s adoption of proportional representation (Jackson and McRobie, 
1998), in many respects the party systems and electoral patterns within the two 
countries remain remarkably alike (Vowles and Bean, 2006). It is thus reasonable to 
approach a comparative analysis of attitudes about the public interest with 
expectations of relatively similar patterns between the two countries. Where divergent 
patterns emerge they may point to interesting features of one or other political system 
that are not shared by the other. 
In the analysis that follows the focus is on data collected in New Zealand in 
2002 and Australia in 2004, as part of the New Zealand Election Study and Australian 
Election Study respectively. These studies involve nationwide random sample surveys 
of the national electorates of the two countries, conducted by mail after the relevant 
general elections. Notwithstanding some differences, by and large the two projects are 
procedurally similar, generating similar response rates and both producing final 
samples broadly representative of the respective electorates. The sample sizes are 
5783 in New Zealand and 1769 in Australia. Further details are available in Vowles et 
al. (2004), for New Zealand, and Bean et al. (2005), for Australia.1 
 
Voter Perspectives on the Public Interest in Australia and New Zealand 
The present study focuses on a number of key questions asked in both surveys, as part 
of the larger Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, which may be said to tap the 
notion of the public interest as it applies to the process of representing voter views 
and in contrast to the favouring of special interests. In the first instance we 
                                                 
1 The data sets were obtained from the Australian Social Science Data Archive at the Australian 
National University. The author wishes to acknowledge the staff of the archive, the original collectors 
of the data and also the funding agencies, while emphasising that the analyses and interpretations in 
this paper are solely his. 
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concentrate on representation by way of elections, parties and party leaders. Table 1 
contains data in response to the following questions: ‘Thinking now about how 
elections in Australia/New Zealand work in practice, how well do elections ensure 
that the views of voters are represented by MPs?’; ‘Would you say that any of the 
parties in Australia/New Zealand represents your views reasonably well? If so, which 
party represents your views best?’; ‘Regardless of how you feel about the parties, 
would you say that any of the individual party leaders in the last election represents 
your views reasonably well? If so, which party leader represents your views best?’2  
Let us now examine the responses. What we see on the question about how 
well elections ensure that the views of voters are represented by MPs, is an almost 
identical pattern of response in the two countries. And it is a response that is rather 
more positive than negative. While only 7 per cent of Australians and 6 per cent of 
New Zealanders say that elections ensure that the views of voters are represented very 
well by MPs, a further 49 per cent and 50 per cent respectively say that voter views 
are represented quite well. In other words, in both countries a clear majority of 56 per 
cent say that elections ensure that the views of voters are well represented. On the 
negative side of the ledger, 36 per cent of Australians and 38 per cent of New 
Zealanders say that elections do not ensure that voter views are represented very well 
and a further 7 and 6 per cent respectively say that voter views are not represented 
well at all. But in general these data support Mulgan’s contention that there is an 
electoral incentive for politicians to act in the public interest, at least from the point of 
view of voter perceptions of the functioning of elections.  
[Table 1 about here] 
                                                 
2 There are minor and almost certainly inconsequential variations in the wording between the two 
surveys, due to formatting of questions and grammatical choices. Where these occur the Australian 
wording is shown. 
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The next question in Table 1 is based in the political reality of all 
contemporary democracies that some parties will represent some people’s interests 
better than others. For convenience of layout, different parties in the two countries are 
grouped together, although it is acknowledged that some of the pairings fit better 
together than others. Not unexpectedly, the two governing parties – Liberal (being the 
major partner in the coalition with the National Party) in Australia and Labour in New 
Zealand – receive easily the largest share of respondents saying that these parties 
represent their views best. From more than one point of view, it would be strange 
were this not the case. Again as we might anticipate, the major opposition parties, 
Labor in Australia and National in New Zealand, receive the second largest share of 
support in response to this question.  
What is noticeably different between the two countries, however, is the 
proportion of respondents opting for the two major parties in total. In Australia, those 
nominating either of the two major parties amount to two-thirds of all the responses; 
in New Zealand the combined total opting for Labour or National is less than half. 
This difference surely reflects the differing electoral systems in the modern era, with 
proportional representation having loosened the electoral grip of the major parties in 
New Zealand, while Australian voters remain much more constrained in the electoral 
choices they have (Vowles and Bean, 2006). Some of the slack in New Zealand is 
taken up by minor parties (27 per cent of New Zealand respondents say that one or 
another minor party represents their views best, compared to 17 per cent in Australia, 
with the National Party included) but it is also the case that more New Zealanders (23 
per cent compared to 17 per cent) say that no party represents their views well. 
The final part of Table 1 shows the responses to a parallel question asking 
about party leaders, which acknowledges that while democratic politics might be 
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dominated by political parties, the parties are themselves led by and made up of 
individual politicians. As with the governing parties, the two prime ministers – the 
Liberal’s John Howard in Australia and Labour’s Helen Clark in New Zealand – gain 
far and away the most support in answer to this question. Unlike their parties, the two 
have very similar proportions of their respective electorates saying that they represent 
their interests best (41 and 39 per cent respectively). The opposition leader in 
Australia, however, garners more support than his counterpart in New Zealand. In 
New Zealand the leaders of various minor political parties collectively receive more 
than twice the amount of support on this question as do their Australian counterparts, 
again presumably reflecting the electoral system differences. Appreciable numbers of 
both samples, but more in Australia (21 versus 16 per cent), say that no party leader 
represents their views well.  
In the context of a focus on the public interest, the last two questions in Table 
1 exemplify the fact that in some sense the public interest will always be an amalgam 
of different individual interests, some of which are strongly opposed to one another. 
To the extent that the public interest may be considered to be the sum of individual 
preferences, the equation is certainly more complex than might be implied by a notion 
of the simple addition of terms.  
In Table 2 the notion of the public interest is operationalised in terms of 
political corruption and the extent to which government favours a small number of big 
interests. The first question is: ‘How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe 
taking is amongst politicians in Australia/New Zealand?’ The conceptual implication, 
of course, is that if politicians are involved in corrupt practices they are not pursuing 
the public interest. A follow-on question in Australia, not asked in New Zealand, has 
public servants as the referent. The next question, though conceptually equivalent in 
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the two surveys, is worded differently in the two. Australian respondents are asked: 
‘Would you say the government is run by a few big interests looking out for 
themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?’ In New Zealand the item 
is: ‘The New Zealand government is largely run by a few big interests’, as part of a 
Likert agree/disagree battery.  
Previous research has some interesting insights on attitudes toward the 
standards of behaviour of politicians in Australia. McAllister (2000) shows that the 
Australian public consistently has higher expectations of the behaviour of politicians 
than do politicians themselves. Among other things, McAllister’s data collected in 
1996 show that 73 per cent of the general public think that it is extremely important 
for federal politicians to ‘always put the public interest ahead of their personal 
interests’ while among political candidates only 59 per cent hold the same view 
(McAllister, 2000: 28). 
So what of the data in Table 2? Focusing on the first question, we see that 
while neither country appears to be gripped by a culture of overwhelming concern 
about political corruption, Australians are considerably more likely to view their 
politicians as being corrupt than New Zealanders. Some 9 per cent of Australians 
think corruption is very widespread and another 29 per cent think it is fairly 
widespread, making a total of 38 per cent who see corruption amongst politicians as 
prevalent. In some ways it is difficult to know whether this should be viewed as a 
high or a low figure. In any case, in New Zealand, by contrast, less than a quarter (24 
per cent) think that corruption is widespread to some degree. Put in reverse, this 
means that three-quarters of New Zealanders do not see political corruption as being 
widespread, including a third who think it hardly happens at all. Only 13 per cent of 
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Australians hold a similarly benign view of their politicians, although another 50 per 
cent see political corruption as not very widespread.  
[Table 2 about here] 
If personal knowledge of politicians might lead to a stronger belief in their 
integrity then it is possible that New Zealand’s smaller size and the greater salience of 
Members of Parliament might be one reason why corruption is viewed as less 
prevalent in the smaller antipodean nation (Bean, 1992: 153-54). In other words, the 
oft adduced ‘intimacy’ of New Zealand political culture, an argument that has many 
supporters but some sceptics (Harris, 1995), may account, at least in part, for the 
difference between the two countries on this question. 
For Australia we can also consider how much corruption is seen to prevail 
amongst public servants. The answer seems to be that public servants are viewed as 
being more likely to be involved in corruption than elected political representatives 
themselves. Almost half the Australian sample see corruption as either very or quite 
widespread amongst public servants. The responses shown here are consistent with 
other data showing relatively negative views in Australia of the professional standards 
and responsiveness of the public service (Bean and Denemark, 2007).  
But is government seen to be run in favour of big interests, or for the benefit 
of all, that is, in the public interest? As indicated above, the latter term is left implicit 
in New Zealand and for this reason, combined with the differing response categories 
as indicated in Table 2, it is less appropriate here than for the other questions we have 
considered to concentrate on close comparisons between the two sets of data. We can, 
however, compare the broad patterns evident within each country. We can also note 
that at either end of the spectrum the proportions are very similar in the two countries. 
That is, around 9 or 10 per cent strongly agree that the government is run entirely for 
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the big interests, while at the other end only 1 or 2 per cent strongly believe that the 
government is run entirely for the benefit of all.  
In between, Australians appear to cluster more in the middle while New 
Zealanders’ views are more dispersed, but this is probably as much a function of the 
answer categories offered as anything. The most solid comparative statement that can 
be made with any comfort is that the balance of opinion is more towards the positive 
end of the scale in New Zealand than in Australia. In both nations more people judge 
that government is run by big interests than not, but whereas the ratio is some two to 
one in Australia it is only one-and-a-half to one in New Zealand. This difference 
reinforces the findings on political corruption and thus the conclusion that a greater 
familiarity with politicians may play a role in generating more benign public attitudes 
towards elected representatives. 
 
Social Divisions on Attitudes to the Public Interest 
The variations that have thus far been observed in the responses to questions about the 
public interest show that the public does not speak with a uniform voice on such 
matters. It would be highly unusual if it did. Given what we already know about the 
tendency for different social groups to support different political interests (see, for 
example, Vowles and Bean, 2006), it is interesting to explore the possibility of social 
differences on questions about the public interest. Do, for example, people of higher 
socio-economic standing tend to be more or less critical of political performance in 
relation to the public interest?  
Tables 3, 4 and 5 display the patterns of attitudes on the public interest 
produced by six core social structural variables, namely gender, age, education, 
occupation, ethnicity and region of residence. Examining first the question about how 
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well elections ensure that the views of voters are represented by MPs, the most 
immediate impression to arise from Table 3 is that of more homogeneity than 
heterogeneity between different social groupings. The second is of substantial 
similarity between the Australian and New Zealand patterns on a number of the 
variables.  
[Table 3 about here] 
 By a similar margin in each country, women are more likely than men to feel 
that voter views are well represented by elections. About 60 per cent of women hold 
this view compared to only 51 or 52 per cent of men. There are no differences of any 
note according to age levels and nor, at the bottom of the table, on the basis of region 
of residence. In both countries those in ‘middle class’ occupations are more likely 
than those in ‘working class’ occupations to be positive about the public interest role 
of elections by a modest margin, but whereas farmers in New Zealand behave 
similarly to the middle class, interestingly Australian farmers, a small and rapidly 
decreasing segment of the community, are far more likely than any other category in 
the table to judge that elections ensure that the views of voters are represented. Over 
three-quarters of Australian farmers hold this view.  
 Further differences emerge with respect to education and ethnicity. In New 
Zealand university-educated people are more positive about the public interest role of 
elections while in Australia they are less positive. There are no differences between 
the views of Maori and non-Maori, but in Australia voters from non-English speaking 
backgrounds are more likely than the remainder of the electorate to view the role of 
elections positively.3 
                                                 
3 The indigenous Aboriginal population in Australia is not large enough to be identified separately in 
sample surveys of this nature. Thus immigrant voters from countries whose first language is not 
English are used as the comparator for the Maori indigenous minority in New Zealand. 
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 When the focus turns to political corruption, the data show some degree of 
differentiation within all six socio-demographic variables in both countries (Table 4). 
Moreover, patterns by gender, age, education and region of residence (and to some 
extent on occupation) are similar in both countries, notwithstanding the greater total 
level of agreement in New Zealand that political corruption is not widespread. In both 
countries, men, this time, are some 10 per cent more likely than women to say that 
political corruption is not prevalent; positive views rise steadily by age, so that those 
aged over the age of 65 are more than 20 per cent more likely than the under 25s to be 
relaxed about levels of corruption; the well educated hold more benign views than the 
less well educated (the difference being greater in New Zealand); and urban residents 
are more inclined to be positive on this question than their rural counterparts. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 With respect to occupation, those in non-manual occupations are more likely 
than the manual working class to see political corruption as a rare phenomenon. But 
again the farmers of the two nations diverge in their views. Australian farmers again 
hold more positive views on this question than almost any other group on the 
Australian side of the analysis, while New Zealand farmers are close to the manual 
occupations in their relatively pessimistic stance on corruption. Finally, in relation to 
ethnic identity, while the direction of difference is the same in the two countries, in 
that the minority ethnic group has a less benign view of the extent of political 
corruption, the gap between the views of non-English speaking background and other 
respondents in Australia of only 3 per cent pales by comparison with the 26 per cent 
gap between Maori and non-Maori in New Zealand.  
 In contrast to the cross-national similarities in the data on perceptions of 
political corruption and to some extent on whether elections ensure representation of 
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voter views, the variable focusing on whether government is run by a few big interests 
or for the benefit of all is more inclined to indicate differences (Table 5).4 On a 
number of variables differences among groups are slight in Australia but more 
noticeable in New Zealand. In Australia gender and age produce almost no 
differences, while inter-group differences are small for education, ethnicity and 
region. In some of these cases, such differences as there are run counter to the more 
marked differences apparent within the New Zealand data.5 Only in the case of 
occupation are there substantial differences in Australia. For the third time, farmers 
stand out as holding more positive views than other groups on this question and for 
the third time those in middle class occupations are more likely than those in working 
class occupations to hold a positive view. This latter pattern is mirrored in New 
Zealand, also for the third time, but for the third time New Zealand farmers come 
between the two major occupational groups.  
[Table 5 about here] 
 In New Zealand, in addition to these occupational differences, older members 
of the electorate, the university educated, and non-Maori are much more likely to hold 
the view that the government is not run by a few big interests. To a much lesser 
extent, men and urban dwellers also hold such views more strongly than women and 
rural residents. Reinforcing the patterns for occupation, the greater tendency for the 
university educated than those without a university degree in New Zealand to see the 
public interest as being served is consistent across all three variables. 
 
                                                 
4 Of course the possibility remains that these differences might be in part due to the items not being 
precisely comparable in the two countries. 
5 Some of the differences found in the Australian data even run counter to patterns observed in previous 
Australian studies. For instance, the better educated have in the past been found to have more positive 
views about whether the government is run for the benefit of all than the less well educated (Bean, 
2005: 129). 
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Partisan Differences in Views on the Public Interest 
The last stage of the analysis addresses the question of the extent to which partisan 
affiliations within the electorate may underpin views on the public interest. Partisan 
affiliations are operationalised as the vote for either the governing parties, the major 
opposition party, or the collective minor parties, with non-voting or informal voting as 
a fourth category. Political support is presented in this manner rather than using the 
more conventional depiction of named political parties and even though the 
governments of the time in Australia and New Zealand are formed by parties of 
opposite political persuasions, on the grounds that voters whose preferred party is in 
power, regardless of which party or parties that may be, might be expected to feel that 
the public interest is being better served than would supporters of parties that are not 
in government. This would presumably be more true to the extent that voters tended 
to equate the public interest with their own personal interests.  
 Table 6 presents the responses to the three core questions about the public 
interest by party support. The Australian data support the hypothesis advanced above 
for all three questions. On all three there is a clear line of division between supporters 
of the Liberal-National parties of government and the other three groups of voters. 
The extent of the division varies (it is not as strong for the corruption item as for the 
other two) but it is clearly the dominant line of demarcation (except on the third item, 
where the small number of informal or non-voters are not far behind government 
supporters in expressing the view that government is run for the benefit of all). While 
there is some variation, for the most part opposition supporters, minor party voters 
and non-voters tend to cluster together. 
[Table 6 about here] 
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 In New Zealand, however, the pattern is different. Only on the first question is 
there a division more or less reminiscent of the pattern in Australia. On the corruption 
and big interests questions the New Zealand data show an intriguing clustering of 
supporters of the opposition and governing parties together, with minor party 
supporters not too far away. Is this, perhaps, evidence of the ‘consensus’ promised in 
New Zealand politics by the advent of proportional representation (Vowles et al., 
1995)? The one group that clearly stands apart from the consensus is non-voters, who 
not surprisingly give the most disaffected responses on all three questions. 
 
Conclusion 
One thing that has not been possible to address to any great degree with the data in 
this paper is whether some of the different arguments about the public interest 
resonate to greater or lesser degrees with public perceptions. For example, the data do 
not allow for any real test between Goodin’s (1996) lowest common denominator and 
highest common concern alternative conceptions of the public interest. Some of the 
results do tend to reinforce the argument advanced by Mulgan (1984) about electoral 
incentives for politicians to act in the public interest. Much of the evidence also 
appears consistent with the notion of the public interest as the sum of individual 
preferences. The data on partisan differentials imply that this may possibly be more 
the case in Australia than in New Zealand in the sense of individuals projecting their 
own self-interest onto the public interest. 
 If we accept this claim it points towards a significant explanation for this 
cross-national variation. The mixed-member proportional representation system, 
introduced in New Zealand in 1996, may indeed have delivered a degree of political 
consensus for which such systems are noted. These data on the public interest reveal a 
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degree of cross-partisan consensus in New Zealand that is not only unexpected but 
also sits in contrast to the divergence between government and opposition supporters 
observed in Australia. Of course, the qualification to this argument must be that the 
results presented here amount to only one small set of evidence about one collection 
of political attitudes (and nor is the evidence unanimously reinforcing of the 
argument). 
 Finally, two interesting patterns from the social structural analysis are worth 
noting. The first is the consistent tendency in both countries for voters of higher 
occupational status to display more positive views in relation to the public interest. 
The second is the differences revealed between the two farming communities, with 
Australian farmers repeatedly showing relatively greater faith in the political 
promotion of the public interest than their New Zealand counterparts. The reason for 
this difference could possibly be to do with the fact that farmers constitute a 
significant sectional interest group of the kind whose interests often compete with the 
public interest (Mulgan, 1984). In Australia the coalition of parties that are the 
traditional political allies of farmers are in office, where as in New Zealand the 
traditional political opponents of farmers are in office. For farmers in Australia there 
may again be some conflation of the private with the public in that they perceive the 
public interest to be advanced because their sectional interests are better served by the 
incumbent government. 
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Table 1: Public Perceptions of How Well its Views are Represented by Elections, 
Parties and Politicians in Australia and New Zealand  (percentages) 
 
 
 Australia, 
2004 
New Zealand, 
2002 
 
How well elections ensure voter views are 
represented: 
 very well 
 quite well 
 not very well 
 not well at all 
 (n) 
 
Party that represents views best: 
 Liberal/National 
 Labor/Labour 
 National/NZ First 
 Greens 
 Aust. Dem./United Future 
 One Nation/ACT 
 Other 
 None 
 (n) 
 
Party leader who represents views best: 
 John Howard/Helen Clark 
 Mark Latham/Bill English 
 John Anderson/Winston Peters 
 Bob Brown/Jim Anderton 
 Andrew Bartlett/ Peter Dunne 
 Richard Prebble 
 Other 
 None 
 (n) 
 
 
 
 
7 
49 
36 
7 
(1729) 
 
 
40 
27 
4 
7 
2 
2 
2 
17 
(1731) 
 
 
41 
24 
4 
8 
1 
- 
2 
21 
(1738) 
 
 
 
6 
50 
38 
6 
(4686) 
 
 
15 
33 
9 
5 
5 
6 
2 
23 
(4175) 
 
 
39 
14 
14 
3 
7 
5 
2 
16 
(4119) 
 
Sources: Australian Election study, 2004 (n=1769); New Zealand Election 
 Study, 2002 (n=5783). 
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Table 2: Public Perceptions of Political Corruption and Governmental Self-
 Interest in Australia and New Zealand (percentages) 
 
 
 Australia,   
2004 
New Zealand, 
2002 
 
How widespread is corruption amongst politicians: 
 very widespread 
 quite widespread 
 not very widespread 
 hardly happens at all 
 (n) 
 
How widespread is corruption amongst public 
servants: 
 very widespread 
 quite widespread 
 not very widespread 
 hardly happens at all 
 (n) 
 
Government run by a few big interests: 
 entirely for big interests/strongly agree 
 mostly for big interests/agree 
 half and half/neither 
 mostly for benefit of all/disagree 
 entirely for all/strongly disagree 
 (n) 
 
 
 
9 
29 
50 
13 
(1696) 
 
 
 
12 
36 
43 
9 
(1702) 
 
 
10 
31 
38 
19 
2 
(1727) 
 
 
5 
19 
44 
32 
(3651) 
 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
9 
37 
24 
29 
1 
(3772) 
 
Sources: Australian Election study, 2004 (n=1769); New Zealand Election 
 Study, 2002 (n=5783). 
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Table 3: Perceptions that Voter Views are Well Represented by Elections within 
Different Socio-Demographic Groups (percentages) 
 
 
 
 Australia, 2004 New Zealand, 
2002 
 
Gender 
 Male 
 Female 
 
Age 
 Under 25 
 25 – 44 
 45 – 64 
 65 and over 
 
Education 
 No university degree 
 University degree 
 
Occupation 
 Manual 
 Non-manual 
 Farmer 
 
Ethnicity 
 NESB/Maori 
 Non-NESB/Non-Maori 
 
Region of Residence 
 Rural 
 Urban (large city) 
 
 
 
52 
60 
 
 
58 
57 
57 
55 
 
 
57 
52 
 
 
51 
57 
78 
 
 
62 
55 
 
 
57 
55 
 
 
51 
60 
 
 
56 
56 
56 
55 
 
 
54 
62 
 
 
51 
58 
57 
 
 
56 
57 
 
 
56 
56 
 
Sources: Australian Election study, 2004 (n=1769); New Zealand Election 
 Study, 2002 (n=5783). 
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Table 4: Perceptions that Corruption is not Widespread within Different Socio-
Demographic Groups (percentages) 
 
 
 Australia, 2004 New Zealand, 
2002 
 
Gender 
 Male 
 Female 
 
Age 
 Under 25 
 25 – 44 
 45 – 64 
 65 and over 
 
Education 
 No university degree 
 University degree 
 
Occupation 
 Manual 
 Non-manual 
 Farmer 
 
Ethnicity 
 NESB/Maori 
 Non-NESB/Non-Maori 
 
Region of Residence 
 Rural 
 Urban (large city) 
 
 
 
68 
58 
 
 
48 
54 
67 
70 
 
 
61 
68 
 
 
55 
66 
69 
 
 
60 
63 
 
 
61 
65 
 
 
82 
71 
 
 
60 
71 
80 
81 
 
 
72 
88 
 
 
70 
79 
72 
 
 
53 
79 
 
 
74 
79 
 
 
 
Sources: Australian Election study, 2004 (n=1769); New Zealand Election 
 Study, 2002 (n=5783). 
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Table 5: Perceptions that Government is Largely Run for the Benefit of All within 
Different Socio-Demographic Groups (percentages) 
 
 
 
 Australia, 2004 New Zealand, 
2002 
 
Gender 
 Male 
 Female 
 
Age 
 Under 25 
 25 – 44 
 45 – 64 
 65 and over 
 
Education 
 No university degree 
 University degree 
 
Occupation 
 Manual 
 Non-manual 
 Farmer 
 
Ethnicity 
 NESB/Maori 
 Non-NESB/Non-Maori 
 
Region of Residence 
 Rural 
 Urban (large city) 
 
 
 
21 
20 
 
 
20 
20 
21 
21 
 
 
21 
18 
 
 
15 
23 
29 
 
 
17 
21 
 
 
22 
19 
 
 
 
32 
28 
 
 
15 
26 
33 
34 
 
 
26 
44 
 
 
22 
34 
27 
 
 
14 
33 
 
 
29 
32 
 
Sources: Australian Election study, 2004 (n=1769); New Zealand Election 
 Study, 2002 (n=5783). 
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Table 6: Attitudes to Political Representation and the Public Interest by Party Support 
(percentages) 
 
 
 
 
 Views  
Represented 
 
No  
Corruption 
Govt Run  
for All 
  
Aust 
2004 
 
 
NZ 
2002 
  
Aust 
2004 
 
NZ 
2002 
  
Aust 
2004 
 
NZ 
2002 
 
Government 
 
Opposition 
 
Minor Parties 
 
Non-Voter/Informal 
 
 
74 
 
43 
 
32 
 
46 
 
 
68 
 
44 
 
47 
 
36 
 
  
70 
 
58 
 
54 
 
50 
 
80 
 
79 
 
72 
 
51 
  
33 
 
8 
 
9 
 
26 
 
34 
 
33 
 
25 
 
13 
 
 
Sources: Australian Election study, 2004 (n=1769); New Zealand Election 
 Study, 2002 (n=5783). 
 
 
